Vibranium Audits · R.I.T.A. Methodology

No black box.

Every point in a R.I.T.A. score is attributable to a finding you can see, with the weight printed next to it. Rules are authored by the auditors behind 480+ smart-contract audits — not an unexplainable model.

Scan risk score (0–100, higher = riskier)

Starts at 0; each finding adds its weight; capped at 100. Verdicts: ≥60 red flags · 25–59 review recommended · <25 no automated flags. Informational findings carry zero weight.

FindingWeightNotes
OFAC-sanctioned address+80CRITICAL — appears on the U.S. Treasury SDN list (self-hosted, refreshed daily)
Honeypot token+60HIGH — buyers may be unable to sell (GoPlus)
Scam-list match+50HIGH — recorded phishing / stealing / cybercrime activity
Unlimited approval to unverified spender+40HIGH
Owner can mint / hidden owner+30MEDIUM — skipped for trust-listed tokens (USDT/USDC have these by design)
Flagged-address interaction+25MEDIUM
Mixer exposure / high transfer tax (≥10%)+20MEDIUM
Unverified contract source+15MEDIUM
Blacklist function present+5LOW — a capability, not evidence of use; also skipped for trust-listed tokens

Protocol security score (Monitor, 100 → 0)

Starts at 100; open incidents subtract until triaged (acknowledged, resolved, muted, or marked false-positive). Repeated identical events within a cooldown window fold into one incident — alert quality over alert volume.

Open CRITICAL incident−40
Open HIGH incident−25
Open MEDIUM incident−10
Open LOW incident−5

Detector validation — historical incidents replayed

These are replays of historical incidents against our detectors — not live customer alerts. Each row below is a genuine, publicly documented exploit. We feed its real, recorded on-chain transaction back through the actual detector code and show what fires. A build-time test asserts every entry still fires on its fixture, so this section can never drift from what the code does. Detectors without a verified real-incident fixture are deliberately absent.
CRITICALRari Capital / Fei Protocol reentrancy2022-04-30 · Reentrancy · loss ~$80M

Alert would have read: Reentrancy pattern — the victim contract was re-entered on the SAME function while an earlier call was still executing (81 same-function re-entries in one transaction). The exact shape of a reentrancy exploit. In the real Aave V3 Pool traffic we measured, normal composability produced zero same-function re-entries.

Scope: we detect same-function reentrancy — the canonical class (Rari/Fei, TheDAO). Cross-function reentrancy is not currently claimed; a multi-signal rule for it is on the roadmap.

verify the transaction ↗0xadbe5cf9269a001d7b35c6replay fixture: reentrancy-rari.json
HIGHRonin Bridge exploit (USDC withdrawal)2022-03-23 · Suspicious outflow · loss ~$625M total; this tx: 25.5M USDC

Alert would have read: Large outflow detected — the watched bridge contract transferred 25,500,000 USDC out to an external address in a single transaction, far above the alert threshold.

verify the transaction ↗0xed2c72ef1a552ddabb9b08replay fixture: outflow-ronin.json

Live coverage right now: 3 watch targets under continuous monitoring across 3 customer protocols, with 12 detector checks armed. Real counts from the database — our own internal, demo and test workspaces are excluded — and we only ever show detections we actually made.

What we promise — and what we don't

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